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Hungary's cold civil war

Hungary's 1956 anniversary season has been dominated by bitter polarisation. Unless imaginative steps are taken to restore political legitimacy, it could get even worse, says George Schöpflin.

From the outside, Hungary looks like a fairly conventional democracy with a left wing (currently in power) and a right wing (in opposition), each having its turn at governing the country. All the institutions of democracy seem to be in place, with civil society, independent judiciary and the usual checks and balances. You have to be Hungarian to understand that this is a facade and that behind it, things have gone disastrously wrong. It is no exaggeration, though outsiders find this hard to credit, that Hungary is in a state of cold civil war.

If something is rotten in the Hungarian political system - and only the most optimistic would deny this - then the rottenness flourishes behind barriers of great thickness, to the point of impermeability. These barriers are built to keep out critical opinion and alternative perspectives that might disturb the existing status quo. They are barriers of the mind and are constructed of words, of rhetoric, of abuse, of accusations and of projecting one's flaws onto one's opponents, who then become, for political purposes, enemies. Besides, the two words - ellenfél and ellenség - are very alike in Hungarian.

On the fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 revolution, unquestionably one of the most inspiring and moving events in Hungarian history ever, some of the hard reality of the cold civil war, fought until then with words, spilled over into physical violence.

George Schöpflin is a member of the European parliament for Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Union) and was Jean Monnet professor of politics at University College London.

Also by George Schöpflin in openDemocracy:

"Putin's anti-globalisation strategy"
(10 July 2006)

"Israel-Lebanon: a battle over modernity"
(8 August 2005)

"Hungary: country without consequences" (22 September 2006)

On 23 October 2006, the anniversary of the start of the revolution, a peaceful and legal commemoration in Budapest, organised by the opposition, was dispersed with extraordinary brutality by the police. The crowds were already leaving when the police weighed in with mounted charges, teargas grenades, rubber bullets fired at people's heads, water-cannon and steel truncheons. From now on, 23 October will not just be a day for commemorating a revolution aimed at restoring democracy and freedom, but also as the moment when many people's faith in democracy was shaken to the roots.

To ensure that no one is called to account for the behaviour of the police, the government has placed all the relevant files on the secret list for eighty years. When the chief of Budapest police was called before a parliamentary committee, the left-wing members walked out, the police chief refused to answer questions and then walked out too. Civil society is as deeply divided as party politics and the Hungarian branches of the various international human rights bodies also lean to the left, which explains why their response to the events has been muted.

It is in this sense that the memory of 1956 and events of today have become merged. If anything, the commemoration has simply exacerbated matters. The government expected trouble and used the events to ensure that the right's mobilisation of protesters would not happen again - people have been intimidated.

In a broader perspective, the Hungarian political system has become completely blocked. There is no possibility of movement in parliament while the left maintains its unity and, thereby, its majority. In formal legal terms, the government is covered. But politically the division is so deep as to make democratic politics effectively impossible.

A question of legitimacy

This is where law and politics diverge. Politically, the government is acting as if it were a beleaguered minority and is seeking every opportunity to erode the opposition. In total, there have been five major steps in this process.

  • the left-wing government, headed by the Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party), won the April 2002 elections and embarked on a massive spending spree, for which there was simply not enough money.
  • when taken to task by the European Union for overspending (as a potential member of the eurozone, Hungary is expected to keep within the Maastricht criteria), the government responded by returning figures that concealed the real state of affairs. Brussels knew this, of course, and sent the figures back, demanding a new convergence plan. (Most recently, on 9 November in Budapest itself, the EU financial affairs commissioner Joaquín Almunia issued another warning that Hungary was in a very difficult situation and that if the government neglected its obligations to the EU, a partial suspension of cohesion funds transfers would not be out of the question. This is diplomatic language veiling an unusually tough message).
  • the government announced an austerity plan, which Hungarian public opinion received with bad grace, given that only a few months earlier the left had been insisting that the economy was fine.
  • the sensational leaking on 17 September of prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány's speech to a party gathering in which he boasted of having lied "morning, noon and night", which provoked demonstrations outside parliament.
  • the local government elections, held on 1 October, in which the left was badly defeated, losing control of every county apart from Budapest. Public opinion polls have been showing a growing wave of support for the opposition Fidesz (of which I am a member).

In a very real sense, Hungary and the Hungarian political system are in a profound dilemma: what to do when the legally elected government loses its popular support, cannot renew it, insists that its formal legal control of power is legitimate and is sufficient for the exercise of power. The informal rule-book of democratic behaviour would say that the government should observe self-limitation and accept that it must renew its legitimacy, either by making concessions or calling new elections. It has lost its connection to society and must re-establish trust.

There is no sign that the government is ready to do this; on the contrary. Hence the democratic system is blocked and, as long as the will to launch a course correction is absent, there is no way of returning to something like a political equilibrium. The result is the ever more dangerous polarisation that has gripped the country.

Until the present crisis, there appeared to be some tacit limits to the exercise of power - above all, a recognition that there were national interests that transcended those of the political parties. This is now in doubt. The left seems to be so thoroughly shaken that it has come, not wholly consciously, to conclude that its interests are those of the country and of Hungarian society, and that those who oppose it are evil-minded, hostile and deserve to be eliminated.

Much of the language used by the left backs up this proposition. A socialist MEP, Gyula Hegyi, published an article in the Guardian ("We evacuate the territory of the left at our peril", 25 October 2006), in which he accused Fidesz of keeping "its doors open to the extreme right" and said that the former Fidesz prime minister Viktor Orbán "encouraged the rioters". There is no evidence to support these accusations, but they are the standard fare of leftwing discourse in Hungary.

Even more extreme was an article by András B Göllner, a government insider, in the Los Angeles Times ("Hungary's anti-Democracy Revolution", 7 October 2006), which went so far as to claim that Orbán was on a par with Hitler. Not only is this untrue, but the language simply enhances the polarisation. It is inconceivable that a leftwing commentator would allow himself or herself to equate the leader of the democratic opposition with Hitler.

Also in openDemocracy on Hungary in 1956 and 2006:

Gabriel Partos, "Hungary: change via continuity"
(8 May 2006)

Patrice de Beer, "Budapest 1956-2006" (2 October 2006)

Victor Sebestyen, "Twelve Days"
(23 October 2006)

Krzysztof Bobinski, "Hungary's 1956, central Europe's 2006: beyond illusion"
(27 October 2006)

Gabriel Partos, "Hungary: history's battleground"
(8 November 2006)

and ... the Bad Democracy saga

A political trap

Because the left is aware of the need to keep the European Union persuaded of its credentials, it has begun a campaign to discredit Fidesz abroad. Hungarian ambassadors have been instructed to spread negative information about Fidesz and Orbán, a move that seriously undermines the impartiality of the civil service, though a majority of diplomats are left leaning anyway.

In effect, the left is hitting out with whatever methods it can use, regardless of the basic rules of democracy. The primary target is Fidesz, the main opposition party, which now has a solid majority in the polls - disappointed socialist voters have begun to drift rightwards.

But if the left were successful in its campaign to discredit Fidesz and marginalise it, the outcome would be significantly worse. For the time being, Fidesz is leading public opinion and thereby giving it a recognisable political quality; but if Fidesz were to be eliminated, then the left would have to face a much more serious threat, that of a spontaneous anti-government movement driven by popular anger.

The left inherited an economy on taking office in 2002, that was in a reasonable state, despite its clumsy attempts to blame Fidesz for the present crisis. The overspending has now created deficits and foreign debts which the Hungarian taxpayer has to shoulder. Real incomes are expected to shrink by 10%, and the budget deficit is over 10%. For the moment, foreign investment is still flowing into Hungary, but if the political instability were to spread, that movement would stop. The economic crisis is dire, and it can only be tackled with popular support, which means renewing trust and legitimacy.

A key role in the crisis has been played by the media, around four-fifths of which reflects the views and assumptions of the left. Where much of the media thus acts as an echo chamber and fails to observe its critical function, the left is deprived of a key instrument for understanding the reality of the situation.

In his "lying" speech, Gyurcsány freely admitted that the media are "prepared" and "involved" in what the goverment does; alarmingly, no one sought to deny this. Hence the language and ideas of the left, in unquestioningly reinforcing the presumptions of the government, have become a trap. In effect, the Hungarian left has acquired all the characteristics of a closed society (an especially ironic outcome, given that the Hungarian-born billionaire philanthropist George Soros has spent a good deal of money on the left precisely to promote an open society).

A way out?

Anyone looking at events in Hungary in the round will certainly see all the elements that are moving the country towards a potential tragedy. It is as if the Hungarian political elite has lost the capacity to stop the juggernaut, so that the left's insistence on the dangers of a far-right coup could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Something like the atmosphere of war psychosis that Andrew Stroehlein found in the United States can be discerned in Hungary, except that the "enemy" is immediately present and not some faceless terrorist abroad (see "The war in American hearts and minds", 11 September 2006).

There is a Hungarian warning against "painting the devil on the wall, lest it appear." This is precisely what is happening. The left has conjured up the non-existent threat of a fascist, right-extremist, anti-democratic movement coordinated by Fidesz and it is doing what it can to make this a reality by its actions. The left quite fails to see that wiping Fidesz off the map would bring something far worse into Hungarian politics.

Is there a way out? Fidesz has called for a government of experts that would establish the real situation about the economy and elaborate a reform programme on that basis - the government's data is trusted neither in Hungary nor abroad. The proposition would allow the government to save face and escape the trap that it has devised for itself, but the left has ignored it.

This leaves three possible scenarios. There could just be the kind of sudden, rapid collapse of the left's self-confidence that is predicted by catastrophe theory, perhaps brought about by some relatively trivial, unexpected event.

Another possibility is the acceptance of some kind of external intervention, like arbitration via the good offices of the European Union by a commission of "the wise". This could legitimate the much needed spending cuts which the government is unable to impose on its own.

This would be humiliating for Hungary, but better than the last option: the eruption of popular violence, the declaration of a state of emergency and the suspension of democracy. If that were to happen, all bets would be off and the European Union would be faced with an unprecedented crisis of its own. All in all, this is not a happy time to be Hungarian.

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Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford University Press, 2006) US, UK

Bryan Cartledge, The Will to Survive: A History of Hungary (Timewell Press, 2006) US, UK

 
Copyright © George Schöpflin, . Published by openDemocracy Ltd. You may download and print extracts from this article for your own personal and non-commercial use only. If you teach at a university we ask that your department make a donation. Contact us if you wish to discuss republication. Some articles on this site are published under different terms.

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beabona said:



Mon, 2006-11-20 21:40
What could be the role of the Police helicopter that was hovering around the busy street crossing of Astoria where Fidesz fans gathered on October 23?

The people in the Police helicopter could see perfectly everything and were able to coordinate the events from above.

We know the results, that Mr. Sch�pflin sees very well, -( because he is an expert of politics and what is more he is Hungarian) , - contrary to janos.boris and almodozo. From their comment I draw the conclusion they are the fans of the government.

It�s a ridiculous effort to urge consensus with a party who hasn�t got a fair thought not to speak about their uttered words.

As you see I�m not a fan of the present government at all, that�s why I agree with the comments of kis-geza and flaszlo.

janos.boris said:



Fri, 2006-11-17 10:46
The totally lopsided and biassed article by Shopflin, himself a deputy of his much-praised Fidesz in the EP, but even more the last, extremely silly contribution by flaszlo, show extremely well, how far things have deteriorated in Hungary. Facts, realities no longer exist, only interpretations, as if people were living in two different "mirror worlds". In these worlds even idiotic conspiracy theories like flaszlo's have a "rightful" place, especially in the rhetoric of the right wing.

Few doubt that Fidesz acts in collusion with, or at least tacitly cooperates, with the extreme right, even its lunatic fringe (its leader, Viktor Orban, holds the theory of "one flag, one camp", meaning the "the entire right" should be under a single umbrella, an error that has already cost him two parliamentary elections). Hence, Schopflin's taking offence at Adrew G�llner's article is baffling. Schopflin, in his moral outrage over "the brutal police attacking innocent people," conveniently forgets to mention, that extreme rightist groups, wreaking havoc on Budapest all day, had been on a rampage since the morning of October 23, and practically fought running battles with the police for hours before the merging of the two crowds, Fidesz's legal demonstrators and the illegal illegal "street fighters". (Neither is there any mention of the still unanswered question as to why Fidesz had to hold its mass rally in a site, a busy stree crossing in fact, completely unfit for gatherings, where something of this kind was bound to happen, and where no rallies had been held in the past eighty years or so.) There is ample evidence that these groups deliberately "pulled" the police to the direction of the peaceful demonstration.

According to the paranoid conspiracy theory of the right, shared by hard-core Fidesz fans like flaszlo, this was all " a provocation" organized by government agents, as was every single illegal act that was committed

on that day, and all the participants were "Communist provocateurs".

It shows the utter stupidity of this entire narrative--supported in the last resort also by essays such as Schopflin's---that the same mixture of extreme rightists and hard-core Fidesz fans practically identify today's Hungarian ruling coalition with "the Communist" and especially those against whom the people of Hungary rose up in 1956. That is completely absurd: unlike in 1956, Hungary is a free country today with complete freedom of the press, a freedom of opinion, where civil liberties are respected, the current coalition won in free parliamentary elections, etc. The PM's leaked "lie" speech was, according to many, much more an expression of facing up to the previous lies at long last, and the confirmation of an honest will to break with the decades-long practice of lying to the people than the cynical admission of deceit that the right makes it out to be.

Mistakes or lies aside, the currently ruling coalitioon has nothing to do with either Communisms or dictatorial methods. On the other hand, Fidesz, and especially its leaders, having lost two parliamentary elections in a row, is now trying to use extra-parliamentary, unconstitutional means, to force the government to resign, and since it does not have the parliamentary majority to achieve this, it tries, to do so by using the streets to exert pressure.

Mr. Schopflim may not like this, but this is clearly Weimar tactics: terrorizing the streets and frightening people to the point where, in their desire for peace, they might be ready to yield to the right wing's demands for power (while the fact that Fidesz is also the largest party in opposition gives it a semblance of parliamentarians.)

What makes this tragic--and in this, I agree with Mr. Schofplin--that all this is taking place at a time crucial to the future of Hungary, where there ought to be at least a modicum of consensus if any progress is to be made. While there is an urging need to restore the country's budget balance (the deficit being currently the highest in the EU), Hungary also expects a massive infusion of money from the EU, to be spent of infrastructural, and other projects. The main direction where all tha money should go ought to be a subject of serious discussion and ultimate agreement, at least as far as the main issues are concerned, because the projects involved would cover several election cycles, and, conceivably, several governments. Still, at the moment there is not even the slightest trace of any dialogue. I do not to see that the kind of black-and-white right-wing criticism emanating from Mr. Schopflin's essay, and his distortions of the facts, lead any nearer to the desired goal of restoring a dialogue.

flaszlo said:



Thu, 2006-11-16 21:48
You can see by this two comments, how deep is the polarisation in Hungary. The communist secret services, wich newer were called back, have a light play with the angry population. They can organise such provocative actions like the Tank drive toward the police, or other issues. And FIDESZ had demonstrated on the 4-th November that without the help of the police there is no agression. On the other hand, just the Socialist parties (the Socialist Workers Party, better known as Communists and the National Socialist Workers Party, better Known as Nazis or Fasists) were the only Parties in Europe using power and agression agains the people. And they were the only ones who were killing people. Millions of them without any moment of regret. If somebody knows any other Party, without the word "Socialist" in their names, killing poeple in Europe, please tell me. I�m looking for it, but cant find any.

A writer said that Hungary have had the fasists with most stupidity and the most agressive Communists whitout any invertebration and not less stupid as the fasists were. In 90 percent of the cases, they were the same people. If the Hungarian society dosn�t faces this problem, there will be no Chatarsis and the Problem will come back again and again, untill the Hungarians desapear from the map.

Good Night Hungary

kis-geza said:



Wed, 2006-11-15 10:11
I was very glad to read such a good and comprehensive article about Hungary's current situation. This was so far the best article I ever read in your web site. Congratulation to the author, to George Sch�pflin!

I think it is very hard to predict what will happen in the next months and in the next few years in Hungary. Hungary does not have a democratic tradition to continue like in Great Britain or in Germany after the 2nd World War and in the reality the ruling parties are not controlled by any democratic way - do not forget that todays's crisis was caused by the fact that there was no person or democratic institutions or media who could control the goverment since 2002-, certainly the current Prime Minister, Gyurcsany has far the largest influence on the future. I must add that Gyurcsany is the only candidate for the president of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) which would mean an extreme concentration of power in one person in Hungary.

I think that there is a 4th possible scenario knowing Gyurcsany's extremist ambitions. The Socialist Party leaded by Gyurcsany would introduce a reformdictature (a term recently introduced by some leeading socialist economic "experts") supported by the violent police and by the centralised govermental media very much like what the Chinese Communist Party does in China. The Western countries would support this dictature in Hungary as they actually support China because of their economic interests.

almodozo said:



Wed, 2006-11-15 17:36
George Sch�pflin, an esteemed scholar on the region, correctly describes Hungary as a society of impermeable barriers, which "keep out ... alternative perspectives that might disturb the existing status quo" on both sides of the political divide. He sketches this climate of mutual distrust evocatively.

The problem is that Sch�pflin, now an MEP for Fidesz, himself seems to have become part of the problem. His perspective is that of one of the two irreconcilably opposed sides - and one that appears bent on "keeping out alternative perspectives" when it does not fit with partisan interests.

The prime reason I logged on to say this, is because of how he describes the events of 23 October. He writes that "a peaceful and legal commemoration .., organised by the opposition, was dispersed with extraordinary brutality by the police. The crowds were already leaving when the police weighed in with mounted charges, teargas grenades, rubber bullets fired at people's heads, water-cannon and steel truncheons." And that's the extent of it, in his recounting.

This is a staggeringly incomplete version of events. Like everyone else, Sch�pflin has seen the images of protestors driving an actual tank, raided from a 1956 exhibition, into police lines. The relevant part here is that this happened even before the violence reached the peaceful Fidesz demonstration that Schopflin describes, which was taking place further down the road on Asztoria Square.

The street violence of 23 October started on and near downtown Deak Ferenc Ter. The demonstrators who gathered there were people who earlier that day had been driven off Parliament Square, where they had held daily demonstrations for several weeks. These demonstrations had been organised by several civic groups, with a prominent role for the far right. They were organised separately from the Fidesz demonstrations - when Fidesz amassed onto Parliament Square as well on 6 October, the two groups actually had separate stages.

On 23 October, the two thus also gathered separately. And while Fidesz held its peaceful mass rally on Asztoria, the "Parliament Square groups", having been evicted from 'their' square, had roamed to Ferenc Deak Square. What happened there is a matter of contention. What is clear is that, whether the police was provoked or not, it came down on the protestors there with overwhelming violence. In turn, the protestors turned into rioters, pelting the police with stones and setting up barricades near the square - and it was around this time that protestors hijacked the historic tank and drove it into police lines.

All of this happened while further down the boulevard, Fidesz was still holding its rally - which was indeed peaceful. What followed, again, is a matter of contention. Did far right or Fidesz-allied conspirators deliberately coax the police towards Asztoria Square, so as to involve the far larger mass of Fidesz protestors into the melee? Or was it the police which deliberately drove the rioters into the peaceful Fidesz rally, so as to discredit Fidesz?

In any case, the police did drive the rioters to Asztoria, where they merged with the Fidesz demonstration which was indeed just dissolving, and the street fight promptly escalated in size, with police and rioters besieging each other the rest of the night on Asztoria, Rakoczi Boulevard, and later Ferenciek Square and Erzsebet Bridge.

To reduce this story line to one of the police simply battering into the peaceful Fidesz demonstration without provocation is very misleading. The irony is that it smacks of the exact partisan politicking that Sch�pflin denounces in the rest of his article.

There are other, related problems.

For example, in conclusion, Sch�pflin accuses the left of "conjur[ing] up the non-existent threat of [an] anti-democratic movement", warning against "painting the devil on the wall, lest it appear."

The tendency of Hungarians, in these heated times, to interpret the other side's actions in grotesquely alarmist terms is indeed one of the main stumbling blocks to overcoming the current problems. But the irony here is that Sch�pflin himself engages in exactly this as well, right underneath. He conjures up a similarly alarmist scenario that few outside the Hungarian right would take seriously for a moment: "the declaration of a state of emergency and the suspension of democracy." The boy who cried wolf comes to mind.

This appears to be the problem of Hungarian democracy now. Even as the party programs of the two rivals do not, arguably, differ more than those of your typical rightwing and leftwing party in other European countrues, the two camps see each other in Manichean terms: good vs evil, forever assuming the other side will do no less than topple democracy itself. Something of a "war psychosis" indeed, except that, as Shopflin proves, the problem is only ever recognised in the other party. Perhaps an MEP for one of the two 'warring' parties is just not the best-placed observer of such a deeply embittered society.

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