Chávez, already head both of state and of government, will shortly become the leader of a single ruling party, created - like Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the 1920s - not by politicians seeking to form a government but by a government seeking to hold on to power.

He has unchallenged personal authority over the armed forces, which now bear the name of his own movement ("Bolivarian", after independence hero Simón Bolívar) and whose generals now routinely proclaim "motherland, socialism or death!" (in violation of a constitutional ban on their involvement in politics).

Under a new armed-forces law, his role as commander-in-chief now gives him direct operational control not only over regular troops but also of a political militia (‘reserves' and ‘territorial guard'), intended eventually to number some 2 million.

The law specifically assigns the military a role not only in the external defence of the nation but in the maintenance of internal order, which in practice means defending the "revolution".

Every member of the 167-seat, single-chamber parliament professes allegiance to Chávez, following an opposition electoral boycott in 2005. Not content with that, he sought (and obtained) powers to rule by decree in eleven key social, political and economic areas for eighteen months.

A committee of loyalists, answerable only to him and meeting behind closed doors, is currently working on a reform of the 1999 constitution (itself framed under his supervision) to bring it into line with his new, "socialist" vision for the country.

Almost half of the 350 articles in the current constitution are likely to be amended, and although the changes must be put to a referendum, the likelihood is that voters will be asked for a "yes" or "no" to the whole package. ("More democratic? Impossible!" proclaimed Chávez, a supposed champion of "participatory democracy".) Moreover, the political loyalty of Venezuela's electoral authority, the Consejo Nacional Electoral / CNE, substantially reduces the possibility of defeat.

Among the proposed changes: indefinite re-election for the president and an end to the autonomy of the central bank. This last is, in any case, largely fictitious: a large chunk of the country's foreign reserves has already been converted into funds directly controlled by Chávez that are effectively beyond parliamentary control.

The state oil corporation, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), which is the major source of government revenue, also hands over cash for clientilistic social programmes and foreign aid under Chávez's supervision. In practice, the president thus controls a slush fund amounting to tens of billions of dollars.

Is he one of us?

In addition to parliament, the other three supposedly independent branches of government - the supreme court, the CNE and the "moral republican council" (state prosecutor, comptroller-general and ombudsman) - are all staffed by chavista militants.

The state prosecutor Isaías Rodríguez was formerly Chávez's vice-president. The current vice-president, Jorge Rodríguez, used to chair the CNE. He oversaw the president's successful defeat of a mid-term recall referendum in 2004, and is now reaping the benefits.

The president of the supreme court (TSJ) since February 2007, Luisa Estela Morales, is a prominent member of the constitutional-reform committee, despite the fact that the court is the ultimate arbiter of the reform's legality. A parliamentary investigation of seven supreme-court justices with a view to their possible dismissal, announced on 22 March 2007, may also help dissuade any backsliders from trying to water down the reform. Any use of the courts "behind the back of the leader" to frustrate the will of the government is (said Chávez recently) "a betrayal of the people".

To minimise the possibility that dissidents might infiltrate government institutions, the state sector applies a policy of denying jobs to those identified with the opposition. A computer programme known as the Maisanta List classifies over 12 million Venezuelans by their political preferences, and even private-sector firms with government contracts are often banned from employing those with the wrong political credentials.